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TERM OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME
COURT
(AUGUST 1975 - AUGUST 1976)
CIVIL PROCEDURE
During the August 1975 term, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court continued to decide cases brought prior to the effective
date of the new Rules of Civil Procedure.' Perhaps because of
this fact, the 1975 term produced few decisions significantly
affecting procedural law.' However, noteworthy decisions deal
with the exercise of personal jurisdiction and the propriety of
declaratory judgment actions. In addition, in reviewing the for-
mer practice, the court took several opportunities to comment
at length on the new practice.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The most significant procedural decision of the 1975 term
dealt with the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In Hasley v.
Black, Sivalis & Bryson, Inc.,' the court once again analyzed
the Wisconsin long-arm statute4 and the due process considera-
tions which accompany its application. In this products liabil-
ity case, the plaintiffs sued both the manufacturer of two hori-
zontal dust scrubbers and the manufacturer of the bull plug
pipe fitting contained in each machine. The plaintiffs sought
to recover for personal injuries and property damage sustained
in a natural gas fire that occured when the plaintiff Hasley
attempted to stop a gas leak by tightening the bull plug in one
of the machines. The manufacturer of the machine, Black,
Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., then cross complained against the
component parts manufacturer, J.B. Smith Manufacturing
Co., a Texas corporation. Personal jurisdiction over Smith was
the only issue in the case. The trial court denied Smith's mo-
1. 67 Wis. 2d 585 (1975) (effective January 1, 1976).
2. Many decisions merely reaffirmed preestablished procedural rules. See, e.g.,
Ewing v. General Motors Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 962, 236 N.W.2d 200 (1975); Dalton v.
Meister, 71 Wis. 2d 504, 239 N.W.2d 9(1976), discussed infra.
3. 70 Wis. 2d 562, 235 N.W.2d 446 (1975).
4. Wis. STAT. § 262.05 (1973) (renumbered Wis. STAT. § 801.05 (1973)), has been
frequently construed by the court. See, e.g., Afram v. Balfour, Maclaine, Inc., 63 Wis.
2d 702, 218 N.W.2d 288 (1974); Nagel v. Crain Cutter Co., 50 Wis. 2d 638, 184 N.W.2d
876 (1971); Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970);
Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis. 2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1970).
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tion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. However,
the defendant Black, not the plaintiff, appealed the trial
court's order. After applying the appropriate section of the
long-arm statute, Wisconsin Statute 266.05(4)(d), and after
applying the due process analysis developed previously in
Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co.,' the court reversed the trial
court and held that personal jurisdiction over Smith could not
be obtained.
The court acknowledged that the threshold requirements of
former Wisconsin Statutes section 262.05(4)(b)6 were satisfied
by the obvious existence of a local injury allegedly caused by a
foreign act, but because Smith's only contact with Wisconsin
was the manufacture of the bull plugs used in each of the two
machines, the court had to determine whether these contacts
met requirements of subsection (4)(b), i.e., whether the pres-
ence of two of Smith's components in Wisconsin were
"[p]roducts, materials or things processed, serviced or manu-
factured by the defendant [which] were used or consumed
within this state in the ordinary course of trade."7
In deciding that Smith was within the scope of subsection
(4)(b), the court continued its now familiar practice of relying
heavily on the Revision Committee comments." These com-
ments reveal that subsection (4)(b) attempted to codify the
jurisdictional rules found in many products liability cases that:
where the action is upon a local injury caused by an act done
elsewhere, and there is no element of consensual privity be-
tween the parties, respecting the action, a basis exists for
personal jurisdiction over the defendant only when he is
shown to have some other contact with the state in addition
to the facts involved in the particular action sued upon; this
concept underlies proposed subsection (4).1
5. 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970).
6. Wis. STAT. § 262.05(4)(b)(1971) (renumbered Wis. STAT. § 801.05(4)(b) (1973)).
This subsection provides:
(4) LOCAL INJURY; FOREIGN AcT. In any action claiming injury to person or
property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this state by
the defendant, provided in addition that at the time of the injury either:
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by
the defendant were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course
of trade.
7. Wis. STAT. § 262.05(4)(b)(1971).
8. 70 Wis. 2d at 577-78, 235 N.W.2d 454. See also Afram v. Balfour, Maclaine, Inc.,
63 Wis. 2d 702, 218 N.W.2d 288 (1971).
9. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05, Revision Notes, (Supp. 1975).
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The court also relied on a factually similar federal case,
McPhee v. Simmonds Saw & Steel Co.10 In that case the court
refused to permit the extension of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where the sole contact with Wisconsin was the pres-
ence within the state of the very component part which gave
rise to the suit. The court construed the phrase "products,
materials or things processed" in subsection (4)(b) to require
that more than one item manufactured by the defendant be
within the state at the time of the injury." On the basis of the
Revision Committee notes and the McPhee holding, the Hasley
court held that since Smith sold many components to Black
with the knowledge that the plugs would be included in prod-
ucts assembled and distributed by Black and since more than
one item manufactured by Smith was used within this state at
the time of the injury, the requirements of section 262.05 (4) (b)
were met. 12 The court reached this result notwithstanding the
fact that both plugs reached Wisconsin in a single transaction:
"The manner of their arrival is a qualification on the exercise
of jurisdiction only in that ordinary commercial practice be
involved. A single sale may involve such a number of items that
long-arm jurisdiction under the section arises without ques-
tion." The court thus chose to construe broadly the terms of
the long-arm statute and to remedy any resulting abuse or
hardship in the second stage of the jurisdictional analysis, the
due process analysis.
The due process principles which apply to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin have been relatively settled
since the Zerbel case.' 4 Once the court establishes the existence
of a minimum contact of the defendant within Wisconsin and
that the cause of action arises out of that contact, the court
applies a five-part analysis of the nature and quality of that
contact and Wisconsin's interest in the action. By this analysis
the exercise of personal jurisdiction is made consistent with fair
play and substantial justice. 5 It is at this stage of the analysis
10. 294 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
11. Id. at 782.
12. 70 Wis. 2d at 580-81, 235 N.W.2d at 456.
13. Id. at 581, 235 N.W.2d at 456.
14. See cases cited supra note 4.
15. Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 50, 62-63, 179 N.W.2d 872, 877
(1970). Zerbel applies the principles of due process set out by the United States Su-
preme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
19771
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that jurisdiction over Smith fails. The court distinguished
cases such as Campbell Construction Co. v. Palombit" and
Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club,'7 where the manufacturer
of component parts relied on a single network of distributors to
reach the ultimate consumer, with Smith's situation, where
Smith's sales to original equipment manufacturers like Black
are but a small part of its business and where Smith's sales to
Black constituted a mere .4% of Smith's total sales volume. 8
The court noted that Wisconsin's adoption of a strict liabil-
ity theory of products liability represents an important state
policy of protecting its residents from defective products. This
policy is similar to California's desire to protect its citizens
from the abuse of the life insurance industry which the United
States Supreme Court held to justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident insurance company in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.'9 Nevertheless, the court
found this analogy to McGee unpersuasive, since the state pol-
icy protecting consumers was invoked on appeal by Black, a
defendant, and not by the plaintiffs. The court therefore found
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Smith failed to
satisfy due process.
The Hasley decision is unsatisfactory, both in its applica-
tion of the long-arm statute and in its due process analysis of
the case. The long-arm statute was drafted to embody the prin-
ciples of due process underlying long-arm jurisdiction." Al-
though a finding that a particular cause of action is within the
terms of the statute should not preclude consideration of the
larger question of whether exercise of personal jurisdiction in a
particular case comports with due process, it is unfortunate
that the court has chosen to construe the terms of the statute
independently of the due process concepts which it was in-
tended to embody. Thus the application of subsection (4)(b)
(1945). The five-part analysis of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with fair play and substantial justice, as required by the Supreme Court in
International Shoe, includes the following considerations: (1) the quantity of contacts,
(2) the nature and quality of contacts, (3) the source of the cause of action, (4) the
interest of Wisconsin in the action, and (5) the convenience of the litigants. 48 Wis.
2d at 65-66, 179 N.W.2d at 878.
16. 347 Mich. 340, 79 N.W.2d 915 (1956).
17. 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
18. 70 Wis. 2d at 586, 235 N.W.2d at 459.
19. 355 U.S. 220 (1957), cited at 70 Wis. 2d at 587, 235 N.W.2d at 459.
20. See note 9 supra.
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now turns on whether one or more than one item processed by
the defendant is used in Wisconsin. A manufacturer like Smith
who sends two pipe fittings to Wisconsin in a single sale is thus
amenable to suit, while a manufacturer who sends only one is
not. Yet there may be no qualitative difference in their contacts
with Wisconsin, as the court's due process analysis reveals.
Instead of being construed in a way consistent with the due
process concepts on which the statute was originally based, in
Hasley the long-arm statute has become little more than an
outer boundary marking those cases which the legislature has
determined cannot possibly satisfy due process. Given this
negligible role in the determination of a jurisdictional question,
it is difficult to see a purpose for the enactment of a long-arm
statute at all.
The Hasley court's due process analysis is also unsatisfac-
tory. The court makes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a component parts manufacturer depend not upon whether the
defendant has a national distribution system for its products,
as did Smith, but upon the nature of the peculiar chain of
distribution which has brought the component giving rise to
the suit to Wisconsin. Hasley seems clearly to suggest that had
the plaintiff purchased the defective dust scrubber containing
the defective component part from one of Smith's regular dis-
tributors rather than from an original manufacturer like Black,
Smith would have then been amenable to suit, even though the
pattern of Smith's business activities and product distribution
and the number of its contacts with Wisconsin remain un-
changed.21
The court acknowledged Wisconsin's policy of favoring
recovery by consumers in products liability cases, but refused
to give that fact weight because it was invoked by another
manufacturer instead of a consumer. The essential question to
21. The court's conclusion here is all the more surprising in view of the restrictive
interpretation it takes of Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the case most
troublesome for any court which seeks to extend personal jurisdiction over a defendant
on the basis of the defendant's national distribution of a defective product. In Hansen
the court stated that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 357 U.S. at 253.
The court adopts the Seventh Circuit interpretation of this passage which stresses the
foreseeability that defendant's products would arrive in Wisconsin, instead of the
purposefulness of the defendants' activities in making this occur. 70 Wis. 2d at 584-
85, 235 N.W.2d at 457.
1977]
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be resolved by the due process analysis is whether there exist
"such contacts of [the defendant] with the state of the forum
as make it reasonable in the context of our federal government,
to require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which
is brought there."22 It is difficult to perceive how the answer to
this question is affected by which party happens to argue the
jurisdictional question, especially in view of the economy re-
sulting from the litigation of plaintiff's claim and defendant's
cross claim for contribution in the same action.
II. JOINDER OF CLAIMS
Dalton v. Meister2 represents a reaffirmation of the joinder
principles established in Rogers v. City of Oconomowoc. 24 Thus
in Dalton the court held that a cause of action against the
defendant bank for fraud in a Hawaiian property deal designed
to dispose of the defendant's estate outside the reach of his
creditors was properly joined with an action for conspiracy to
defraud Meister's creditors. Even though that claim does not
affect all parties to the action, the court held that as long as
one primary right-the adjudication of the disposition of
Meister's property-was the subject of the suit, the claims were
properly joined. Moreover, this analysis of party joinder, per-
mitting the plaintiff to sue various defendants on various theo-
ries of action to recover for the invasion of a single primary
right even if the form of relief does not affect the parties
equally, applies to the new joinder rules. 25
Dalton also held that under former section 263.04 a plaintiff
could properly join a special proceeding with a civil action as
long as the joinder of claims was otherwise proper. 2 The court
criticized contrary language in Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp.
v. Vogel2" to the effect that actions and special proceedings
cannot be consolidated under former section 269.05.28 The
Dalton court further stated that under the new rules, which
22. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 335 U.S. 220, 317 (1945), quoted at 70
Wis. 2d at 581, 235 N.W.2d at 456.
23. 71 Wis. 2d 504, 239 N.W.2d 9 (1976); see also, Ewing v. General Motors Corp.,
70 Wis. 2d 962, 236 N.W.2d 200 (1975).
24. 16 Wis. 2d 621, 115 N.W.2d 635 (1962).
25. Ewing v. General Motors Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 962, 236 N.W.2d 200 (1975).
26. 71 Wis. 2d at 516, 239 N.W.2d at 16.
27. 54 Wis. 2d 321, 324, 195 N.W.2d 664, 666 (1972).
28. Wis. STAT. § 269.05 (1971) (repealed and replaced by Wis. STAT. § 806.04
(1973)).
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speak only of the joinder of "claims," and not of "actions" as
did former section 263.04, the same result is reached." The
court's criticism of Wisconsin Brick & Block suggests that the
consolidation of an action and a special proceeding is now
unquestionably permissible under new section 805.03.
III. POST-EVIDENCE MOTIONS
In Household Utilities, Inc. v. Andrews Co.3" the court re-
solved the disputed question 3' of which standard the trial court
must apply in ruling on a motion to dismiss brought at the
close of the plaintiff's case in a trial to the court. Moreover, this
case has continuing precedential value because its holding ex-
pressly takes into account new Wisconsin Statutes, section
805.14. In Household Utilities, a simple contract action tried
to the court, the defendant moved for a nonsuit at the close of
the plaintiffs evidence, on the grounds that the plaintiff failed
to prove a contract. The trial court weighed the evidence pre-
sented in the plaintiffs case in chief and then granted the
motion.32 The defendant appealed, contending that the proper
standard for ruling on a motion for nonsuit in Wisconsin is
whether the plaintiff presented any credible evidence to sup-
port his claim.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court made it
clear that the motion for nonsuit and its accompanying stan-
dard of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff is inappropriate in a trial to the court.1 As the court
pointed out, in a trial to the court, the court is the ultimate
trier of fact. 4 Because the plaintiff has the burden of persuad-
ing the trier of fact, in ruling on a motion to dismiss at the close
of the plaintiff's evidence, the court should weigh the evidence.
The court's decision to grant the motion must therefore consti-
tute a disposition of the case on the merits. 5
This view of the standard to be applied when ruling on a
motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiffs case is consis-
29. 71 Wis. 2d at 516, 239 N.W.2d at 16.
30. 71 Wis. 2d 17, 236 N.W.2d 663 (1976).
31. Compare Newton v. Newton, 33 Wis. 2d 182, 147 N.W.2d 328 (1967) with J.
CONWAY, WISCONSIN AND FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 61.02 (1975).
32. 71 Wis. 2d at 23, 236 N.W.2d at 666.
33. Id. at 24, 236 N.W.2d at 667.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 24-25, 236 N.W.2d at 667.
19771
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tent with the position taken by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 6 However, it conflicts with the rule of an earlier Wis-
consin case, Newton v. Newton,37 ironically, a decision also
written by Justice Beilfuss. In Newton, the court held that in
ruling on a motion to dismiss in a trial to the court, the court
must apply the same standard as it uses in ruling on a motion
for nonsuit in a jury trial and must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.38 Moreover, in Newton the
court also held that if a defendant whose motion to dismiss is
denied fails to rebut the prima facie case made out by the
plaintiff in presenting his own case, the plaintiff would be enti-
tled to judgment on the merits, even though the plaintiff, al-
though making a prima facie case, has not met his burden of
persuading the trier of fact. 9 In Household Utilities, Justice
Beilfuss resolved the confusion left by Newton over the stan-
dards which apply to a motion to dismiss in a trial to the court.
The contrary language of Newton was overruled.
Household Utilities also resolved the uncertainty in the
standard to be applied by the appellate court in reviewing the
trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. The Newton case
indicated that the trial court's ruling would not be reversed on
appeal unless the appellate court found it to be unsupported
by any rational view of the evidence,4' while State ex rel. Ski-
binski v. Tadych expressly held that the standard for the trial
court and that of the appellate court were the same - the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.',
Household Utilities now makes it clear that the standard to be
applied in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss is exactly
the same as the standard to be applied to any final judgment
of a trial to the court: whether the trial court's findings are
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evi-
dence.42 The court expressly overruled the contrary holding of
State ex rel. Skibinski v. Tadych.
In Household Utilities the court applied its holding to the
36. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2371
(1971).
37. 33 Wis. 2d 182, 147 N.W.2d 328 (1967).
38. Id. at 187, 147 N.W.2d at 330.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 188, 147 N.W.2d at 331.
41. 36 Wis. 2d 36, 152 N.W.2d 865 (1967).
42. 71 Wis. 2d at 28, 236 N.W.2d at 669.
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current procedure under Wisconsin Statutes section 805.14.11
The court pointed out that Wisconsin Statutes section 805.14
abolishes the motion for a nonsuit and substitutes the motion
to dismiss in both a trial to the court and a trial before a jury.
However, the court also stated that "the rule draws no ap-
parent distinction in application between a trial to the court
and one before a jury. Indeed, standing alone, [Wisconsin
Statutes section 805.14(1)] appears to be equally applicable to
both types of cases."" Wisconsin Statutes section 805.14(1)
provides:
No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a
matter of law to support a verdict. . shall be granted unless
the court is satisfied that, considering all credible evidence
and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favora-
ble to the party against whom the motion is made, there is
no credible evidence to sustain a finding in favor of such
party.
Contrary to the court's statement, the reference to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence "as a matter of law to support a verdict"
in the statute makes it apparent that this standard applies only
to jury trials and not to trials to the court. Unfortunately, at
the time Household Utilities was decided the statute did not
also contain a similar statement of the standard to be applied
in trials to the court. The omission lead to an easy misreading
of the statute. The new rules have since been amended to spec-
ify expressly the differing standards which apply to a motion
to dismiss in a trial to the court and one to a jury. 5
43. Wis. STAT. § 805.14 (1973).
44. 71 Wis. 2d at 28, 236 N.W.2d at 668.
45. The holding of Household Utilities, Inc. v. Andrews, 71 Wis. 2d 17, 236 N.W.2d
663 (1976), is reflected in the recently adopted amendments to the new Wisconsin
Rules of Procedure. The changes, which became effective on January 1, 1977, are as
follows:
Amend Section 805.14(3) to read:
(3) MOTION AT CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE. At the close of
plaintiff's evidence in trials to the jury, any defendant may move for dismissal
on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence. If the court determines that the
defendant is entitled to dismissal, the court shall state with particularity on the
record or in its order of dismissal the grounds upon which the dismissal was
granted and shall render judgment against the plaintiff.
Renumber Sections 805.17(1), (2) and (3) to (2), (3) and (4) and create (1):
805.17 TRIAL TO THE COURT (1) MOTION AT CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S
EVIDENCE. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury,
has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving
19771
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IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The 1975 term produced two noteworthy constructions of
the Wisconsin declaratory judgments statute. 6 In State ex rel.
Lynch v. Conta, 7 an original declaratory judgment action, the
district attorney for Dane County sought a declaration that the
Wisconsin open meeting statute" applied to a series of private
meetings held by state legislators during the 1976 budget bill
deliberations. Since the open meeting statute includes a forfei-
ture provision for violations49 and is therefore penal in nature,
the legislators contended that an action would be improper if
brought by the district attorney, the person seeking to enforce
the statute, and not the person threatened by the statute. The
court held that although declaratory judgment actions brought
by the prosecutor are to be avoided, they are nonetheless pro-
per as long as the parties are genuinely adverse and as long as
the controversy is otherwise appropriate for declaratory relief:"0
[T]his court, or any trial court, while not encouraging those
charged with law enforcement to petition for declaratory
judgments, will accept such cases in the exercise of discre-
tion. Such exercise would be guided by the normal principles
of declaratory judgment. In most situations, the action
should be refused until the order of parties is reversed so that
the party subject to the penal law is plaintiff.5'
As the court pointed out, this result is consistent with ear-
lier Wisconsin case law as well as the language of the declara-
tory judgments statute. That statute states that it must be
liberally construed 2 and provides that "any person. . . whose
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute"
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for
a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and
render judgment against the plaintiff on that ground or may decline to render
any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment
on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in
sub. (2). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dis-
missal under this section operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
49 Wis. B. BuLL. 70-71 (August, 1976).
46. Wis. STAT. § 269.56 (1973) (renumbered Wis. STAT. § 806.04 (1973).)
47. 71 Wis. 2d 662, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976).
48. Wis. STAT. § 66.77 (1973).
49. Wis. STAT. § 66.77(10) (1973).
50. 71 Wis. 2d at 671, 239 N.W.2d at 323.
51. Id. at 672, 239 N.W.2d at 324.
52. Wis. STAT. § 269.56(12) (1973).
[Vol. 60:379
TERM OF THE COURT
may seek declaratory relief.53 Since the open meeting statute
gives the district attorney a right of enforcement when he has
received a citizen's complaint, and since such a complaint was
made in this case, the court concluded that the district attor-
ney was a proper plaintiff under Wisconsin Statutes section
269.56(2). The court then found that the other requirements for
declaratory relief were met and declared that the private meet-
ings were within the "partisan caucus" exception of the statute
and were exempt from the requirements of the open meeting
law.
In State ex rel. Lynch the Dane County district attorney, a
state officer, encountered no difficulty in bringing an action for
declaratory relief. However, in Lister v. Board of Regents,54
where the parties were reversed, the private citizens who
sought a declaratory judgment against state officers, the Board
of Regents, as defendants were unable to surmount the obstacle
of the state's immunity from suit.
The plaintiffs in this case, former Wisconsin law school stu-
dents, joined claims for declaratory and injunctive relief with
a claim for money damages against the Board of Regents. They
sought a declaration that at the time they attended the law
school, they were residents of Wisconsin entitled to pay in-state
tuition fees under former Wisconsin Statutes section 36.16.
51
The court pointed out that declaratory judgment actions, like
all civil actions, are barred by the principles of sovereign im-
munity. However, in view of the appropriateness of the declara-
tory judgment action for resolving questions of the constitu-
tionality and application of statutory provisions, courts engage
in the fiction that allows such actions to be brought against a
state official on the theory that where the official has misap-
plied a state statute, he has acted beyond his constitutional
and jurisdictional authority and has lost his immunity to suit. 6
In Lister the court made it clear that, for purposes of permit-
ting declaratory relief, a finding that a state officer has acted
outside his authority is not conclusive as to whether he has
53. Wis. STAT. § 269.56(2) (1973).
54. 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).
55. Wis. STAT. §§ 36.16(1)(a), (ab), (ac), (ae), (ak), (b) and (3) (1969) were re-
pealed and Wis. STAT. § 36.27(2) (1973) was created by 1973 Wis. Laws ch. 335 §§ 7,
15 which changed the standards for determining residency contained in the former
statute.
56. 72 Wis. 2d at 299, 240 N.W.2d at 621.
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exceeded his authority for purposes of disposing of the substan-
tive claim against him." Thus, in Lister, where the plaintiffs
joined their action for declaratory relief with a claim for dam-
ages, the court held that at least in theory, a declaratory judg-
ment action would lie against the Board of Regents, even
though they are immune from liability on the substantive dam-
age claim.
However, the court ultimately denied the propriety of plain-
tiffs' declaratory action on the grounds that the students failed
to present a justiciable controversy since they were no longer
law students and did not anticipate future enrollment:
The dictum that an action for declaratory relief from the
erroneous application of a statute is really against the indi-
vidual officer or agency acting in excess of his or its authority
becomes too apparent to be adhered to where no anticipatory
or preventative objective will be served. A declaration which
seeks to fix the state's responsibility to respond to a monetary
claim is not authorized by Wisconsin's Declaratory
Judgments Act.58
The court thus made Wisconsin law consistent with the gen-
eral view that a declaration of the state's duty to refund or pay
money which cannot actually be recovered, due to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, and which is sought merely to obtain
an adjudication of legal rights is not a proper declaratory ac-
tion. 9 However, the court did leave open the possibility that
such a suit can be brought where plaintiff anticipates future
assessments"0 under the statute or in circumstances justifying
the court's decision to entertain a declaratory judgment action
albeit otherwise improper in matters of great public import-
ance.
6i
PATRICIA GRACZYK
57. Id.
58. 72 Wis. 2d at 308, 240 N.W.2d at 625.
59. See 1 W. ANDERSON, AcTioNs FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 179 (2d ed. 1951).
60. 72 Wis. 2d at 307, 240 N.W.2d at 625.
61. 72 Wis. 2d at 309-10, 240 N.W.2d at 626.
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